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ABSTRACT 
I disrupt notions of the passive, unidimensional Islamic "Woman" by outlining the discursive constitution of gendered subjectivtities 
and practices in Pakistan. I trace the shifting intersection of discourses of gender, nationhood, and Islam, and demonstrate how this 
intersection both effects an ideological tool - "Pakistani Woman" - and incites women's resistance. 
RESUME 
Je seme la confusion dans les notions de la « Femme islamique », passive, unidimensionnelle, en donnant les grandes lignes de la 
constitution discursive des subjectivites propre a chaque sexe et les pratiques au Pakistan. Je trace 1'intersection divergente des discours 
sur les hommes et les femmes, sur la nationality et l'lslam, en demontrant comment ils amenent et un outil ideologique « la Pakistanaise » 
et incite la resistance des femmes. 
INTRODUCTION 
Here, the women are always suffering. 
They give too many children birth. And 
they let men handle them like weak 
people. That's their lot. They can't be seen 
or heard. That's a big problem here for me, 
the plight of Pakistani women. 
(Nilofer Orange, 1999)' 
The discourse of the passive, 
male-dominated Islamic "Woman" meanders 
through much of the interview material I gathered 
for my research on how western women living in 
Gilgit, Pakistan, negotiate their subjectivities in 
transcultural and postcolonial space.2 Outside the 
interview transcripts, this discourse constitutes, in 
part, the practised subjectivities of both western and 
local women living and interacting in the small 
mountain town of Gilgit (Foucault 1978; Stoler 
1995). My research participants are not alone. Many 
recent feminist analyses also "diagnose" the status 
of women in Islamic countries using such 
ethnocentric, homogenising, and monocausal 
explanations (Brooks 1995; Ghoussoub 1987; 
Haddadand Smith 1996; Hassan 1995; Mohammad 
1999). This occurs despite a large body of 
postcolonial and poststructural feminist literature 
that recommends attempts both to understand how 
the category "Woman" is discursively constituted in 
specific and contingent contexts, and to identify 
how various discourses intersect to constitute 
gendered subjectivities and material practices 
(Frankenberg 1993; Mohanty 1984; Spivak 1985, 
1988). 
My aim here is to disrupt the givenness of 
this passive, oppressed, and unidimensional Islamic 
"Woman" by outlining the discursive constitution of 
gendered subjectivities and practices in Pakistan 
from 1947 to the late 1990s. Specifically, I trace the 
shifting intersection of discourses of gender, 
nationhood, and Islam during that time, 
demonstrating how they constitute, reproduce, and 
legitimate one another. Although individual 
Pakistani women practise these discourses in 
different ways depending on their situatedness 
within discourses of class, modernisation, ethnicity, 
and location, one of the irregular regularities 
(Foucault 1980) of the discursive formation that 
results is the construction of an idealised "Pakistani 
Woman," who becomes available to state leaders 
and Islamic fundamentalists for ideological 
purposes. For example, when state and religious 
leaders restrict women to the confines of the private 
sphere through their politico-religious rhetoric, as 
well as in law, they fashion a "Pakistani Woman" 
almost exclusively as wife and mother. That wife 
and mother becomes useful in projects of 
nation-building and Muslim group identity 
construction. 
Pakistani women's organised resistance to 
this disciplinary regime is a theme which runs 
unevenly throughout the paper. In the tradition of 
Hammani and Rieker (1988) and Sharoni (1994), I 
describe Pakistani women as active social 
participants engaged in negotiations of power as a 
way to undermine reified and Orientalist (Butz 
1995) conceptions of homogeneous "Islamic" 
women as passive, helpless victims. Space 
limitations, however, prevent me from emphasising 
Pakistani women's everyday resistance, the ways in 
which individual women disrupt disciplinary 
discourses and practices in and through their daily 
activities. 
A brief outline of the rise of the Pakistani 
state will help contextualise my topic. In 1940, 
Mohammed AH Jinnah, future founder of the state 
of Pakistan, presented the Lahore Resolution to the 
Muslim League, apolitical party founded in 1905 to 
advance the agendas of India's Muslim landowning 
class. This resolution inaugurated the Pakistan 
Movement, a nationalist crusade for an 
independent, non-theocratic Muslim state, where 
Islam could be practised free from the constraints of 
the British government and the Hindu-oriented 
Indian National Congress. The agenda of the 
Muslim League, similar to that of other colonised 
groups attempting to reassert a Muslim identity 
through nationhood, was grounded primarily in 
anti-colonialism (Shaheed 1986). The British Raj 
imposed on its colonial subjects laws and practices 
which left little room for Muslim colonial subjects 
to satisfactorily practise Islam in their daily lives 
(Hasan 1981). Jinnah incorporated a sense of 
beleaguered Muslim identity, along with growing 
dissent against British rule and the West more 
generally, into his fight for independence and an 
oppositional national identity. In his efforts to forge 
a common Muslim front, Jinnah consistently 
represented Muslim women as a vital nationalist 
resource. 
Jinnah shared this practice of constructing 
and appropriating women for nation-building 
purposes with many other nationalist leaders in 
South Asia and elsewhere. Yuval-Davis and 
Anthias (1989), in their study of women's relation to 
national processes and state practices, provide a 
useful typology for understanding the historically 
contingent intersection of discourses of gender and 
nationhood. They identify five ways in which 
women have been discursively constituted and 
utilised by nation-state leaders as (a) biological 
reproducers of state members, (b) propagators and 
defenders of the frontiers between nations, (c) 
transmitters of culture who socialise youth into the 
ideological framework of the nation, (d) signifiers 
of national difference, and (e) participants in 
national liberation struggles. An overview of the 
historical development of the Pakistani state reveals 
that various political leaders have drawn unevenly 
on these discursive complexes to support their 
nation- and identity-building agendas. 
In the body of the paper, I augment this 
typology by outlining how discourses of Islam, 
including Islamic fundamentalism, have frequently 
mediated the coupling of discourses of gender and 
nationhood in Pakistan. This three-way intersection 
has strengthened the disciplinary regime and its 
effects on Pakistani women. However, since 
discursive formations are contingent and marked by 
series of ruptures and recuperations, this 
gender-nation-Islam trilogy has shifted with 
changing state mandates, with the effect that new 
discursive spaces, where tangential discourses can 
influence the discursive formation, are continually 
emerging and disappearing. 
WOMAN-NATION-ISLAM 
Women as Biological Reproducers of State 
Members 
Several Pakistani political regimes have 
constructed Pakistani women as biological 
reproducers of the national collectivity. In the 
Pakistan Independence Movement of the 1940s, 
Jinnah represented Muslim women as "mothers of 
the nation" who embodied special, although 
politically limited power. Willmer (1996) argues 
that this discursive use of women for the Muslim 
nationalist cause was constructed within a set of 
existing discourses of gender and modernisation, 
which used the status of elite women to evaluate the 
modernising potential of a polity. Thus, discourses 
of gender, nationhood, Islam, and modernisation 
intersected in the Muslim League agenda. By 
incorporating these discourses into their program, 
the Muslim League's quest for emancipation from 
the Raj and the Indian National Congress gained 
ancillary social meaning. This alliance also meant 
that the concerns of elite Muslim women were 
coopted into the national checklist, thereby quelling 
the development of a modernising feminist 
movement. 
Jinnah encouraged all women to renounce 
their needs and interests, and those of their children, 
to support the development of a more glorious 
Islam. In a speech he gave on Radio Pakistan in 
1948, he stressed that privileged women should take 
the lead, "not only in their homes, but by helping 
their less fortunate sisters outside in that great task" 
(as quoted in Hasan 1981, 71). This discourse 
constructs for women an identity as mothers and 
wives who nurture, support, socialise, and sacrifice 
for the good of the nation. Women were persuaded 
to confine themselves to the parameters of home 
and family in their support of nationalism, 
something the overwhelming majority of Muslim 
women assured Jinnah they were willing to do. As 
Hatem (1993, 45) notes in another context, 
"women's incorporation in the body politic as 
citizens is premised on their acceptance of 
nationalism as the only acceptable discourse." 
Although Pakistani women were 
constituted as wives and mothers sacrificing for the 
Muslim nation, elite women within the Muslim 
League, including Mohtarma Fatima Jinnah 
(Jinnah's sister), had the discursive and spatial 
latitude during the parliamentary period of 
Pakistan's history (1947-57) to promote women's 
rights and public participation (Haq 1996). This 
latitude widened during successive governments, as 
the intersection of discourses of gender, nationhood, 
and modernisation coalesced more confidently, 
shifting discourses of Islam to the sidelines. For 
example, Ayub Khan, who gained power through a 
military coup in 1958, and Zulifkar A l i Bhutto 
(1969-77) after him, concentrated on modernising 
Pakistan, identifying the status of women as an 
important gauge of their success. They both passed 
legislation, including the 1973 constitution, that 
gave women greater rights in marriage, divorce, 
educational opportunities, family planning, and 
employment.3 In 1977, with General Zia-ul-Haq's 
(1977-1988) military coup, the formation of 
gender-nationhood-modernisation shifted abruptly. 
Discourses of Islam were recuperated at the expense 
of modernisation, although their nature altered 
radically. 
In an effort to justify martial law, which 
lacked a social base of support (Gardezi 1985), Zia 
initiated a process of Islamisation with the help of 
right-wing religious fundamentalist parties such as 
the Jama'at-I-Islami. These fundamentalists 
claimed that anything "modern" was a tool of 
Western imperialism. In opposition to the 
"modern," they argued that the foundation of 
Islamic society lay in the sexual segregation of 
women and the reciprocal obligation of the sexes. 
This alternative socio-moral order could 
simultaneously combat neo-colonialism and reassert 
a "true" Muslim identity (Haeri 1995). By 
promoting notions of a unified religion and national 
identity, as well as the moral honour of Islam, 
Islamic fundamentalism became the most influential 
discursive legitimation of Zia's military rule. 
Zia exploited this reactionary form of 
Islam to justify destroying civil society and 
implementing oppressive laws. Legislative changes, 
including family planning restrictions and 
anti-abortion legislation, renewed and strengthened 
the discursive constitution of women as biological 
reproducers of the nation. Islamisation policies 
reinforced the ideal of women's segregation in the 
home. For example, working women were 
constructed as liabilities due to their "lax" morality, 
which ostensibly disintegrated national, Muslim, 
and family values. 
The Hudood Ordinance (1979), which 
narrowed the criteria for rape and included 
fornication and adultery in the criminal code, 
provided the legal context within which women 
were disciplined - by themselves, their families, and 
the state - to remain within the confines of their 
homes where they were less likely to be raped 
(Mehdi 1990).4 The law disciplines women's 
behaviour and spatial movement by constructing a 
vulnerable female identity in need of protection 
from strange men by male family members. Women 
are encouraged to remain safe at home, raising 
children in a segregated family setting.5 
Zia's dictatorship roused Pakistani women 
to organised resistance. Despite the difficult climate 
for protest, urban middle-class women began to 
study the Quran for themselves, determined to 
reinterpret it as an empowering ideology rather than 
an oppressive one (Ayubi 1995). They also 
challenged Zia's junta by inaugurating an official 
Pakistan women's movement in 1981 with the 
formation of the Women's Action Forum (WAF). 
By uniting numerous women's groups under the 
WAF banner, feminists were able to organise a 
collective struggle and set the tone for debates over 
the status of women under martial and Islamic rule 
(Gardezi 1990). They were, however, ultimately 
unsuccessful in halting Zia's Islamisation program. 
I wil l discuss his tenacious legacy in the 1990s later 
in the paper. 
Women as Propagators and Defenders of the 
Frontiers Between Nations 
Pakistani women have also been 
constructed through state legislation as reproducers 
of national boundaries. The symbolic and material 
manifestations of nationhood are most strongly 
expressed through the allocation of citizenship, a 
process that is gendered throughout much of the 
world, including Pakistan (Joseph 1996). The state 
needs to specify who can claim legitimate 
citizenship, because potential citizens identify with 
multiple social groupings, many of which may pose 
a threat to the boundaries and identity of the nation. 
The state frequently draws on discourses of gender, 
as well as class, ethnicity, and religion, to 
differentiate between members of the polity and 
thus establish national boundaries. 
Forging a Muslim, anti-Western national 
identity remained a state imperative during the first 
few years of Pakistan's independence. State leaders 
recognised that establishing strong national 
boundaries would buttress this objective. The 
Pakistan Citizenship Act was passed in 1951. It was 
a law that consolidated intersecting discourses of 
gender, nationhood, and Islam to. constitute 
Pakistani women as reproducers of the national 
frontier. The Citizenship Act prohibited Muslim 
women who married foreign or non-Muslim men 
from passing their Pakistani citizenship to their 
children, but it permitted the children of Muslim 
men married to non-Muslim women to become 
nationals. The legislation controlled the manner in 
which Pakistani women had children by stipulating 
that legitimate Pakistani nationals be born to a 
father of "authentic" Muslim identity. Since 
children gained citizenship and its attendant rights 
through their fathers and not their mothers, an 
explicit connection was forged between fathers and 
national citizenship (Joseph 1996). Pakistani 
women were denied the right to pass citizenship to 
children of non-Muslim fathers in order to enforce 
a national Muslim boundary and male citizenry. 
They became nationals only as appendages of their 
husbands and fathers. Through the process of 
conferring citizenship rights, the state constituted 
and utilised women as reproducers of the 
boundaries of the Islamic nation, while denying 
them citizenship as an autonomous right. 
In April, 2000, General Pervez Musharraf s 
government amended Section 5 of the 1951 Act 
under the Pakistan Citizenship (Amendment) 
Ordinance 2000. The Ordinance provides that the 
children of Pakistani women married to 
non-Muslim men are also entitled to Pakistani 
citizenship. This amendment releases women from 
their role as national frontier scouts and loosens 
slightly the gender-nation-Islam discursive trilogy. 
Women as Transmitters of National Culture 
By framing Pakistani women as "mothers 
of the nation," Jinnah implicitly represented them as 
"cultural transmitters of the nation." He drew on 
discourses of gender, nationhood, and Islam to 
constitute women as wives and mothers confined to 
the private sphere. As such, women were 
constructed as the main socialisers of youth, those 
people responsible for perpetuating Muslim cultural 
symbols and ways of life. Discourses of 
modernisation, which gained political purchase after 
Jinnah, disrupted the discursive formation of 
gender-nationhood-Islam and produced discursive 
space within which some women could practice 
supplementary identities outside the home, 
loosening, however slightly, their exclusive tie to 
children. Zia's Islamisation project, drawing on 
Islamic fundamentalism, coerced women back 
home to take up full-time duty as ideological 
reproducers. 
Zia's 1984 Law of Evidence, for example, 
stipulates that the court requires evidence from two 
men or one man and two women for the conviction 
of a crime, reifying in legislation the notion that 
women's minds function at only half the capacity of 
men's (Doumato 1995). The law works from the 
premise that women's reproductive and socialising 
function renders them unsuitable for public 
responsibilities such as political and labour 
participation and, consequently, that their main 
value is as wives and mothers who socialise youth 
into Islamic culture. 
Male household heads frequently utilise 
and legitimate these circulating discourses of gender 
and Islam to deny many non-elite women academic 
opportunities, or at least strongly dissuade them 
from pursuing their studies. They argue against 
women's education according to the logic that 
academic endeavours interfere with women's 
primary role as wives and mothers, that women's 
public and economic participation is culturally 
inappropriate, and that women ought to be obedient 
in most circumstances (Moghadam 1993). The 
discourse of women's obedience is premised on the 
notion that they surrender their rights to some 
realms of independent thought, action, and 
expression, including educational and employment 
opportunities. The low literacy level among 
Pakistani women (Malik 1995) - one effect of 
intersecting discourses of gender and Islam - traps 
women in the home where they remain 
economically and psychologically dependent. 
Women's coerced entrapment in the home 
is somewhat paradoxical considering the profile of 
fundamentalists who exhorted it. Contrary to 
popular belief, fundamentalists in Pakistan tend not 
to be theological experts, but young, semi-worldly 
rural men who have migrated to the city in search of 
work, but whose lack of education and limited 
resources leave them disenfranchised in the urban 
social, economic, and political spheres (Ayubi 
1995; Stowasser 1993). They are populist 
"scriptural activists" whose agenda is to transpose 
Islamic thought into holy practice with the view of 
establishing more egalitarian social relations, a 
fundamentally political, not religious, act 
(Stowasser, 1993). Fundamentalist notions of 
egalitarianism, however, do not extend to women, 
since they are constructed as the inviolate 
foundation of Islamic society. 
The extremely discriminatory Law of 
Evidence incited Pakistani women to mass protest 
on a scale previously unprecedented in Pakistan. 
The W A F demonstrated their dissatisfaction with 
the draft bill through public lectures, discussion 
groups, resolutions, and artistic performances. The 
protest reached its climax in February, 1983, when 
women's organisations united in a demonstration 
march down Mall Road in Lahore. They planned to 
end their walk with a sit-in near the Court House, 
where the Chief Justice would hear their singing 
and poetry reading and be compelled to accept a 
formal memorandum against the draft legislation. 
Despite the peacefulness of the demonstration, the 
sheer number of women protesting unnerved the 
police. They surrounded the protesters, discharged 
tear gas, beat them until many were seriously 
injured, and arrested 50 women. Rather than 
vanquishing the protesters, this public "attention" 
impelled them to further action and greater 
solidarity.6 Their continuing resistance to the Law 
of Evidence forced the government to delay 
implementing the bill for two years; it was 
eventually ratified in October, 1984. 
Women as signifiers of national difference 
Taking the previous intersection of 
discourses of gender, nationhood, and Islamic 
fundamentalism a step further, Zia cast Pakistani 
women as actual symbolic markers of the nation. 
These "women do not only teach and transfer 
cultural and ideological traditions of [the] national 
group, they constitute [its] actual symbolic 
figuration" (Yuval-Davis and Anthias 1989, 8). 
Through their constitution as wives and mothers, 
Pakistani women become both an alibi for and an 
emblem of cultural authenticity. By appropriating 
Islamist anti-imperialist discourses and advocating 
an "authentic" Muslim identity, Zia drew a cultural 
distinction on the actual bodies of Pakistani women, 
through their spatial movements and sexual 
behaviour. Women's "sexually appropriate" 
behaviour became legally and morally controlled 
since women were viewed as the touchstone of 
what it meant to be Muslim. This preoccupation 
with women's sexual and moral behaviour stems 
from the fact that "the woman question" constitutes 
one of the few Quranic legislative domains, and, 
moreover, from the fundamentalist conviction that 
"good" Muslims should be readily identifiable 
through appropriate clothing styles, polygamy 
practices, and adultery regulations (Keddie 1990). 
According to fundamentalists, women who reclaim 
for themselves the appropriate role of wife and 
mother re-establish an Islamic socio-moral order. 
Women's dress, domesticity, and behaviour thus 
constitute what Keddie calls an Islamic "badge of 
ideology" (101). In Stowasser's (1993, 22) words, 
"culture, religion, and morality stand and fall with 
[Muslim women]." 
Purdah is one institutionalised form of 
restrictive behavioural codes for women. This social 
and spatial system of sexual segregation, where 
women are isolated from men who are not family 
members, was endorsed by Zia to ensure women's 
economic dependence on male family members and 
assure their "function" as wives and mothers. 
Moreover, purdah "protected" women from the 
dangers of the public sphere, while it safeguarded 
family honour by maintaining female modesty. 
Rauf (1987) identifies four principles upon 
which purdah is founded: (a) women must not 
mingle with men who are not part of their 
immediate kinship network; (b) females should be 
physically sequestered from the time of puberty; (c) 
men bear the responsibility for being family 
breadwinners while women reproduce the extended 
household; and (d) women must dress, move, 
behave, think, and represent themselves in 
culturally appropriate ways. Moral responsibility, 
therefore, rests mainly with women. These 
principles are instituted through the division of 
space (between the inside and outside of the home, 
and the male and female places within it) and the 
mandated use of a veil. 
In Pakistan veiling takes diverse forms, 
from the scarf-like dupatta to the head-to-toe 
covering burqa. And, as a signifier, it has a range of 
meanings, depending on the social and political 
context in which it is used. While fundamentalists 
prefer women to veil completely in public as a sign 
of their Musl im identity, modesty, and 
sexual-spatial segregation, Pakistani women, like 
their Muslim counterparts elsewhere, veil to varying 
degrees and with varied meaning: to (a) be 
non-arousing, (b) promote an erotic culture, (c) 
protect themselves from sexual harassment in 
public, (d) express urbanism and their escape from 
the village (where veiling may be less common), (e) 
disguise their lower class clothing, (f) support 
fundamentalist movements, reject western values, 
and assert nationalism, (g) garner sympathetic 
public reaction and comply with group norms, (h) 
pursue a career that they might not otherwise be 
permitted, and (i) signify their class status 
(Abu-Odeh 1992; Afshar 1994; Bulbeck 1998; 
Hammami and Rieker 1988; Mohammad 1999). 
Although many Pakistani women lead quite 
segregated lives according to the rules of purdah, 
most do not and cannot follow strict clothing and 
boundary directives due to economic and labour 
materialities. Consequently, the dupatta and the 
chaddor are more common in Pakistan than is the 
burqa. 
Despite its flexibility of meaning, 
Hammami and Rieker (1988, 93) argue that "the 
veil continues to signify its most historically 
constant meaning - class." Privileged women in 
Pakistan, who have access to often sizeable 
economic resources, are more rigorously regulated 
through purdah than most working- and 
middle-class women (Shaheed 1986). Purdah 
restrictions are frequently applied more strictly to 
women in feudal landowning rural families to deny 
them access to their resources and the public sphere 
where they could mobilise them against both the 
men of their class and the dominant class monopoly 
of property ownership. However, some lower 
middle-class urban women also chose to follow 
stricter purdah regulations to distinguish themselves 
from working-class women (Shaheed 1986). 
As part of his Muslim identity- and 
nation-building strategy, Zia drew a cultural 
distinction between Pakistan and the West on the 
actual bodies of Pakistani women. He reinforced 
and extrapolated the principles of purdah, a 
prevalent social/class system, as part of his agenda 
to re-establish an Islamic socio-moral order. By 
controlling women's spatial movements and sexual 
behaviour, Zia constituted them as the touchstone of 
what it meant to be a "good" Muslim. Whether most 
veiled Pakistan women actually constructed 
themselves as Islamic "badges of ideology", or 
merely covered themselves as a way to move 
unimpeded in public, get an education, or cover 
their shabby clothes, is open to question. 
Women as Participants in National Liberation 
Struggles 
During the Pakistan Movement and the 
early years of the new state, Jinnah consistently 
drew elite women into the struggle for a 
non-theocratic Muslim state. In so doing, he 
strengthened the intersection of discourses of 
gender, nationhood, and Islam. As part of his 
strategy of mobilising Muslim women to the 
nationalist cause, he toured with his sister Fatima, 
advocating the organisation of women's branches of 
the Muslim League in major urban centres, and 
foregrounding both his support of women's rights 
and his contempt for their subordinate position in 
society. 
However, Jinnah and other Muslim League 
leaders deliberately constructed a Pakistan 
Movement narrative that mobilised women 
politically without ever promising them official 
political positions within the proposed nation 
(Willmer 1996). Once the state was formed, 
Pakistani women discovered that the Muslim 
League never intended to engage discourses of 
modernisation as seriously as those of nationhood. 
The Pakistan Movement coopted elite women's 
concerns without forming any specific agenda for 
women. This neglect marginalised women's 
concerns within the framework of the new state, and 
allowed Jinnah to constitute "modernisation" for 
women within an Islamic national framework. For 
example, while he called on women to contribute to 
the national effort, they were asked to do so only in 
"appropriate" ways, as nurturers and supporters of 
the cause and its implicitly male citizenry. Women 
were posted in the Pakistan Women's National 
Guard and the Pakistan Women's Naval Reserve, 
but primarily to support and nurture men, by 
signalling, typing, and administering first aid 
(Mumtaz and Shaheed 1987). By drawing 
selectively on discourses of gender, modernisation, 
nationhood, and Islam, Jinnah constituted Pakistani 
women as vital participants in the struggle for 
national liberation and resources for Muslim 
identity construction, without allowing that to 
outweigh the needs of nation or Islam. 
ZIA 'S LEGACY 
As discourses of Islam mediate the 
coupling of discourses of gender and nationhood in 
Pakistan, disciplinary effects on Pakistani women 
are strengthened. However, ruptures to this 
discursive formation, realised through discourses of 
modernisation during the middle period of 
Pakistan's history, left some women room to 
manoeuvre. Zia's program of Islamisation, by 
rejecting discourses of modernisation as Western 
i m p e r i a l i s m , r e - e n t r e n c h e d the 
gender-nationhood-Islam trilogy. And that 
discursive formation has been difficult to rupture in 
the years following Zia's rule. 
Martial law was replaced by a pluralistic 
democracy after Zia's murder in 1988. Citizens 
angered by Zia's tyranny elected Benazir Bhutto 
(1988-90), who promised to continue her father's 
modernising agenda. That a woman was elected 
prime minister indicated both a widespread 
dissatisfaction with Zia's Islamisation program and 
elite women's discursive latitude within it. Not 
surprisingly, Bhutto was unable to repeal many of 
Zia's initiatives, despite her campaign promises to 
abolish the HudoodOrdinance. The fundamentalist 
Jama 'at-l-Islami continued to exercise power due to 
its state ties. Bhutto maintained a defensive position 
vis-a-vis the fundamentalists who questioned her 
credibility as a female Muslim leader. The 
consolidation of discourses of gender, nationhood, 
and Islam in law and socio-cultural practice was 
also difficult to disrupt, as was the power of the 
military (backed by US military and economic aid) 
(Gardezi 1985). These factors frustrated Bhutto's 
efforts to steer a moderate course. She managed, 
however, to appoint women judges, open banks and 
police stations for women, restore freedom of the 
press, and draw women out of the home and back 
into public and political participation (Haq 1996). 
In contrast to Bhutto, Main Nawaz Sharif 
(1990-93, 1997-99), leader first of the Islamic 
Democratic Alliance and later the Muslim League, 
made the Jama'at-I-Islami party an integral 
component of his coalition government to combat 
political instability and legitimate his rule. He 
resumed the process of Islamisation begun by Zia 
and recuperated the trilogy once again. Specifically, 
he concentrated on making institutions and social 
arrangements conform to Shari'a, the traditional 
socio-religious law of Islam. Women's sexual and 
moral behaviour was state-monitored again as 
Sharif strengthened the Ordinances and censored 
female cultural representations (Pakistan News 
Service Nov. 2,1997). In protest, Pakistani women 
formed Women Against Rape (1990) and 
challenged the Shariat B i l l and a plan for separate 
women's universities. 
Nawaz Sharifs government was 
overthrown through a military coup in October, 
1999, and Pakistan is presently ruled by Chief 
Executive General Pervez Musharraf. Unlike the 
military leaders before him, Musharraf is sidelining 
repressive discourses of Islam in favour of those 
active during Bhutto's leadership. He has vowed to 
fight honour killings and violence against women, 
promote female literacy, encourage women's public 
participation, and, most importantly, modify the 
Hudood Ordinance (Pakistan News Service, Sept.6, 
2000; Pakistan News Service, Oct. 22, 2000). 
However, fundamentalists s t i l l exercise 
considerable power and influence throughout the 
country, especially through their support of the 
Taliban in Afghanistan (Pakistan News Service, 
Nov. 3, 2000). Recently Musharraf inducted two 
religious scholars (ulema) into the National 
Commission for Women. Leaders of W A F criticise 
the appointments as a policy to appease "extremist 
and hardline parties" (Pakistan News Service, Sept. 
7, 2000). Although Musharraf s government is not 
yet democratically run or elected, the discourses of 
Islam he is circulating may provide Pakistani 
women with fresh manoeuvring space. 
CONCLUSION 
I have attempted to follow the theoretical 
guidance of postcolonial and poststructural 
feminists in demonstrating the contingent and 
multifaceted discursive constitution of gendered 
subjectivities and practices in Pakistan through 
time. To understand more adequately the 
intersection of discourses of gender and nationhood 
in the process of subjectivation, I augmented the 
typology outlined by Yuval-Davis and Anthias to 
demonstrate how discourses of Islam, appropriated 
and legitimated by non-theocratic and 
fundamentalist state leaders, have mediated this 
coupling. Tracing the shifting intersection of 
discourses of gender, nationhood, and Islam 
allowed me to avoid monocausal and homogenising 
explanations of Pakistani women's situation in, 
constitution by, and resistance to discourses of 
power. It also demonstrated how the discursive 
formation of gender-nation-Islam fashions an 
ideological tool - the ideal Pakistani "Woman" -
who is then utilised by state and religious leaders 
for nation- and Muslim identity-building practices. 
This three-way intersection, which is 
characterised by various ruptures and recuperations 
over time, has had important but uneven 
disciplinary effects on Pakistani women. While 
political leaders like Zia-ul-Haq and Nawaz Sharif 
tightened the gender-nation-Islam trilogy through 
their appropriation of Islamic fundamentalism, 
others, such as Ayub Khan, Benazir Bhutto and her 
father Zulifkar A l i Bhutto, loosened it through state 
mandates for modernisation. What is most troubling 
about the uneven confluence of discourses of 
gender, nationhood, and Islamic fundamentalism is 
its tenacity in the context of continuing 
neo-colonialism and the persistent oppressive 
effects it has, with varying degrees, on Pakistani 
women. 
But Pakistani women continue to resist this 
disciplinary regime. Recent debates in the literature 
(Gardezi 1990; Mumtaz and Shaheed 1987; Rouse 
1988; Shaheed, 1995) illustrate the controversy 
between two prominent feminist agendas. Leaving 
explicit questions of nationalism aside, one feminist 
group argues that the struggle against gender 
oppression must engage discourses of Islam since 
they fundamentally constitute Pakistani culture, 
legitimate Pakistani feminism, and appeal to 
working- and lower middle-class women who have 
not participated widely in feminist struggles. 
Another group asserts that gender oppression is a 
secular issue of human rights. Shaheed's (1995) 
research identifies two factors that support a 
non-Islamic feminist agenda. First, many Pakistani 
women, despite viewing Islam as a participatory 
and communal spiritual experience, can be 
mobilised around a feminist critique of gender 
oppression independent of Islam. And second, the 
Islam practised by many Pakistani women does not 
resemble that preached by fundamentalists. This is 
well illustrated in fundamentalist parties' poor 
electoral showings in recent years. By nesting 
feminist demands in Islamic justifications, feminists 
risk fundamentalist control of their movement by 
suggesting implicitly that all debates about women 
must be conducted in religious terms. This action 
undermines secular debates, which view women's 
emancipation as a worthy and valuable cause in 
itself, and constructs feminist activism as "alien" to 
Pakistani culture. 
Despite these problematic elements of 
Islamic feminism, some feminist scholars (Kar 
1996; Shaheed 1995) have argued recently that 
secular demands need not, and should not, be 
placed in a binary opposition to religious 
discourses. Rather than mobilising one unified 
women's movement, a multifaceted approach to the 
struggle, realised through a network of independent 
groups and individual practice, may generate the 
momentum and altered subjectivities required to 
disrupt the gender-nation-Islam trilogy. This 
strategy, which involves deconstructing women's 
primary constitution as wives and mothers by state 
and religious leaders and establishing women as full 
legal and social beings, may be the most effective 
route to feminist advances in Pakistan. 
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ENDNOTES 
1. My research participant's pseudonym is Nilofer Orange. 
2. I conducted eight months of ethnographic fieldwork in Gilgit, northern Pakistan in 1999 and 2000. My research explores how 
disciplinary complexes that operate cross-culturally constitute the bodies and subjectivities of foreigners and locals in contemporary 
transcultural space. Specifically, I attempt to decipher how western women reproduce and legitimate imperialism as they negotiate their 
and "Other's" subjectivities in Gilgit. They do so, in part, by drawing on the Orientalist discourse of the passive, unidimensional Islamic 
"Woman." I write the paper to disrupt this discourse (in both practised and written form) and thereby undermine its imperialistic effects. 
3. Khan eventually lost some of his credibility as the defender of women's rights during the 1965 election when he questioned the 
suitability of Fatima Jinnah's candidacy as the leader of the Combined Opposition Parties, arguing that a woman-headed Muslim state 
was un-Islamic. 
4. Mehdi argues that most reported cases of rape in Pakistan, unlike those in the West, are perpetrated by men whom the victims do not 
know. 
5. This less conspicuous intent of the Ordinance is echoed in other fundamentalist legislation based on the Shari'a which identifies 
women's rights under Islam (and consequently their social contribution) as claims to male guardianship, full care in the home, children, 
house-task education, and the honour of preserving Muslim culture. See Doumato, E. 1995. 
6. See Mumtaz, K. and F. Shaheed (1987) for a complete list of the dates and actions taken by women against the Law of Evidence. 
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